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SECURITY DILEMMA PERSPECTIVE
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Abstrak
Tulisan ini memaparkan eskalasi konflik militer yang terjadi antara India dan Pakistan yang
telah terjadi selama tujuh dekade dengan menekankan pada periode pasca perjanjian damai
Deklarasi Lahore 1999. Setelah beberapa kali terlibat perang besar, konflik militer di antara
kedua negara ini terus berlangsung hingga hari ini. Kajian terdahulu perihal konflik IndiaPakistan hanya membahas perihal penyebab konflik ini terjadi dan upaya penyelesaian konflik
yang terbagi ke dalam tiga sudut pandang besar yaitu keamanan, politik domestik dan ekonomipolitik, tetapi belum ada yang menjelaskan bagaimana konflik ini relatif langgeng. Dengan
menggunakan dilema keamanan sebagai kerangka analisis, tulisan ini akan menjelaskan
variabel-variabel dilema keamanan yang memiliki andil dalam ketegangan antara India dan
Pakistan sehingga membuat tindakan ofensif lebih dipilih oleh kedua negara dari pada upaya
defensif. Argumen utama tulisan ini adalah India dan Pakistan saling melihat perilaku satu sama
lain seperti pembangunan kekuatan pertahanan, pengembangan nuklir dan tren aliansi sebagai
ancaman sehingga keduanya selalu berada dalam situasi dilema keamanan.
Kata kunci:
India, Pakistan, Dilema Keamanan, Konflik Militer
Abstract
This paper describes the military conflict escalation between India and Pakistan in the period
after 1999 Lahore Declaration. After several major wars, military conflicts between the two
countries continued to this day. Previous studies on the India-Pakistan conflict only discussed the
causes of this conflict and efforts to resolve conflicts. The studies are divided into three major
perspectives, namely; security, domestic politics, and political economy, but none has explained
how this military conflict is relatively lasting. Using security dilemma as an analytical framework,
this paper will explain the variables of the security dilemma that have contributed to the
escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. The security dilemma creates a circumstance
where offensive action preferable by both states rather than defensive efforts. The main argument
of this paper is that India and Pakistan see each other's behavior -such as the development of
military defense capability, nuclear weaponry development, and alliance trends- as threats so
that they are always remains in the security dilemma situation.
Keywords:
India, Pakistan, Security Dilemma, Military Conflict
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INTRODUCTION
In the anarchic international system, security and stability is priorities sought by every
sovereign state. Burke (2013: 163) stated that the way to secure a state is by gathering
and building capabilities. The view that rooted from this understanding of realism stems
from the idea that a state that has strong forces and weapons will be safe from threats
because of its power preponderance. On the other hand, Mearsheimer (2010: 2) stipulates
that this view carries a paradox because it is precisely due to the anarchic structure of the
international system countries not only seeks safety but also acts aggressively towards
one another. Under these conditions, a state will maintain vigilant behavior enface of
other states. In turns, that make them unable to avoid security dilemmas both on a global
and regional scale. In fact, the end of the Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union in 1989 did not make the two states break free from the the security dilemma
conditions. Although Russia's nuclear threat, which is considered to be the core of the
problem, has been mitigated, the United States continues to maintain its combat-ready
forces in Europe and East Asia.1 This condition continues to this day when the United
States and Russia were pulling out from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty in 2019.2
In South Asia, tensions between India and Pakistan also escalated after the end of
the Cold War after the two states conducted nuclear tests in 1998 (Chari, 2004). The fact
that India and Pakistan are nuclear-weapons states with a history of engaging in military
confrontations make these two neighboring states continue to experience this military
conflict and they are always in an unstable security condition (Gopalan, 2014: 688).
Starting from the 1947 and 1965 War which was triggered by Pakistan that seized the
Kashmir region (Mir, 2014: 108). Kashmir is the main symbol of chosen trauma by
Pakistan, which connotes the myths of fear, anger, sadness and powerlessness of the
people of Pakistan, therefore the struggle to defend Kashmir against India for Pakistan is
a resistance (Hwang, 2019: 21). It was then followed by the 1971 War of independece by
East Pakistan - that became the origin of the Bangladesh state (Mir, 2014: 109). In 1984
the confrontation occurred again due to the seizure of the Siachen Glacier carried out by
Indian forces.3 These military conflicts preceded number of other lines of military conflict
that continue to occur between India and Pakistan. The domestic issues and internal
politics of the two states that are interrelated makes them in a war-alert position.
Moreover, this condition is also amplified by a geographical proximity and the behaviors
of the two states that signal threats.
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To resolve this military conflict, a series of peaceful efforts have also been sought,
such as the 1972 Simla Agreement and the 1999 Lahore Declaration.4 The 1972 Simla
Agreement was a peaceful attempt to resolve 1971 Indian-Pakistani war. The agreement
stipulates that each parties must withdraw their respective forces and conduct a Prisoners
of War (PoW) exchange. This agreement was signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
and President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto on July 2, 1972. This agreement also became a blueprint
for agreements on amicable relations between the two states. The Simla Agreement
consists of a set of guiding principles mutually agreed upon by India and Pakistan that
emphasize mutual respect for the integrity and sovereignty of each region; noninterference in internal affairs, political independence; equality of sovereignty; and
rejection of hostile propaganda. The principles are codified within the following points:
(1) Mutual commitment to solving problems through a bilateral approach. (2) Building
the foundation of cooperative relationships with a focus on people to people. (3)
Maintaining the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, which is an important
Confidence Building Measures (CBM) effort for India and Pakistan, and is the key to
sustainable peace.5
Through the 1972 Simla Agreement, the two states committed themselves to seek
bilateral solutions to problems in Kashmir, without interference from third parties such
as the United Nations (UN), it was also reinforced with Line of Control (LoC) regulation.
But few years after this agreement was signed between 1978-84, Pakistan and India
carried out various expeditions to claim the Siachen region (Mir, 2010). Since India's
preemptive capture of Saltoro Ridge, Pakistan has maintained constant pressure on the
Indian troops by periodic military thrusts, shooting and shelling by heavy artillery (Mir,
2010). These series of military conflict culminates on what was became known as 1999
Kargil War. After the 1999 war, the two states returned to peaceful effort under the 1999
Lahore Declaration. This declaration lays points that demand each other to re-establish
the spirit of the Simla Agreement in 1972. In addition, the 1999 Lahore Declaration also
includes several new points, in which both parties: (1) committed to the goal of universal
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; and (2) take immediate steps to reduce the
risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear and discuss concepts and doctrines with
a view to elaborating steps to build trust in the nuclear and conventional fields, which are
aimed at preventing conflict.6 The 1999 Lahore Declaration had more specific content
on the nuclear discussion, given in the 1998-1999 war both states carried out threatening
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nuclear tests. In addition, this declaration is considered more comprehensive because it is
equipped with a Joint Statement and Memorandum of Understanding.
The India-Pakistan military conflict, which has occured for seven decades, piqued
the interest of academics from Indonesia and other states. Broadly speaking, previous
studies regarding the India-Pakistan issue were divided into three major perspectives
namely; (1) security, (2) domestic politics, and (3) political economy. Studies that utilize
the security perspective examine the conditions of the two states that continue to build
the capabilities of their power, especially in the military realm, which highlights a more
robust Pakistani formation after the 1971 War (Mohan, 2018; Malik, 1994). As a result
of the two states that continue to build capabilities and military cooperation relations with
America and Russia make a security dilemma unavoidable (Hafeez, 1993; Chari, 2004).
This is worsened by ethnic conflicts and regional borders that fight over the Kashmir
region (Wirsing, 2010). With a series of conflicts, the Confidence-Building Measures
(CBMs) mechanism and nuclear weapons control regime are conflict resolution efforts
(Carranza, 2003; Misra, 2001).
The second category is the study of domestic politics, these studies state that the
Indian-Pakistani military conflict stems from the “inadequate preparation” of the British
government when decolonizing these two countries into an independent state (Mir, 2010;
Davis, 2011). Mir (2010: 101) also claimed that the British empires divisive policies
which were aimed at creating rift between Hindu and Muslims in order to dilute any
potential cohesive opposing force. The British pitted these two groups against one
another, state furthermore provoked crises and conflicts (Mir, 2010: 101). This situation
rationalized extreme violence mainly at border areas such as Punjab and Bengal that
experienced the severest mutual violence with taking place on a wide scale (Dalrymple,
2015 in Hwang, 2019). The coercive diplomacy through military institutions has become
a preference of both states due to the series of military conflicts and a nuclear ownership,
(Ebert & Blarel, 2018). Several peace agreements were unable to resolve aforementioned
conflicts (Gopalan, 2007; Misra, 2010). This condition caused a deadlock in both parties
bilateral relations. This brought us to the third studies. The third studies stressed that the
unfavorable economic conditions hamper trade activities between the two states. Both
states preferred to allocate the high portion of their respective state’s budget at the expense
of their citizens’ welfare (Iqbal, 1993; Rizvi, 1993; Khan, 2009).
The previous studies have showed that India-Pakistan hostile behavior towards
each other resulted in precarious bilateral relations. But none of the above-mentioned
222
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studies devote their inquiry on why the India-Pakistan military conflicts is still on-going
and relatively lasting. With that mind, this paper attempts to utilize the concept of the
security dilemma to explain on why each respective parties’ behavior can be interpreted
as a threat. Hence, the question that must be addressed is why does the India-Pakistan
military conflict escalated after the 1999 Lahore Declaration? To answer this question,
the next section of the paper will analyze both states behavior which can be deemed as
threatening such as; improving security capabilities, building alliances to outside parties,
defense equipment acquisitions, military exercises and nuclear weapon-testing; using the
security dilemma perspective.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A security dilemma is a situation when a state adds or builds capabilities that results in
the weakening of other states’ capabilities (Jervis, 2009). The security dilemma itself is a
concept of the realist school of thought. In the tradition of classical realism, the anarchic
international structure forced all the state to adapt war-alert posture. This thought
postulates that the state’s behavior is akin to that of the men who is power-hungry and
aggressive.7 Further, this thought was influenced by the work of Thomas Hobbes (15881679) “The Leviathan”. In “the Leviathan” ([1651] 1968), Hobbes painted a grim picture
in which that “the state of nature” is nasty, brutish, and short. Moreover, Hobbes also
stated that this condition is a result of the absence of a “world government”. Therefore,
humans will behave according to what they may. Hobbes’ postulate serves as a great
contribution to the realist tradition, namely the self-help system. “Self-help system”
obliges all the state to be responsible for their own security.
In the context of the scope of the state, there are two consequences that come from
the absence of a world government are; first, there is nothing that can prevent the
occurrence of war and second, every state is responsible for their own survival (Chiaruzzi,
2012). These conditions provoke the security dilemma situation in which a state will take
into account the actions of its counterpart. Those can be interpreted as threats; hence the
preferred way was to improve the state’s own security. Improving the security will trigger
similar reaction from its counterparts. Accordingly, the security dilemma circle will
perpetuate itself.
In its development, the concept of the security dilemma was first described by the
British historian Herbert Butterfield in 1949. The term itself was created by American
political scientist John Herz in 1950. Both Butterfield and Herz have views that are in line
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with realist views. Butterfield sees that security dilemmas is "the original sin of humanity”
and according to Herz, the root of the security dilemma is anarchy itself.8 Their thought
can be utilized to explain a great war like World War I or a competition between the
United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War9. Then by elaborating on the
two views of Butterfield and Herz, Jervis went further by claiming that the strengthening
the military forces – out of external and internal concerns – provokes a similar reaction
from other states. This is how the vicious circle is formed.
To improve a state’s security is to improve its own military capabilities. Building
up Military Defence Capability (MDC) is something that state should do constantly,
because if it is not the state will be vulnerable to be defeated by other state who poses as
threat (Juwana, 2003: 70). Further Juwana (2003) claimed that defence capability has
evolved from its traditional form such as wall or fortifications and lakes into modern form
of sophisticated military weaponry such as battle tanks, frigates, missiles, fighter aircraft,
and even atomic bombs. Hence, his notion that the present form of defence capability
may also become offensive capability is same with Jervis’ view. Jervis (2009: 104)
suggests that variables that contribute to the conditions of security dilemmas are; (1) a
presence of defense equipment and (2) aggressive foreign policies. The first variable can
manifest in the form of defense equipment acquisition, nuclear weaponry development,
military exercises, military cooperation with other states, defense equipment development
and so on. Jervis (2009: 106) also states no one can ascertain whether a certain arsenal
will be utilized for offensive or defensive purpose. What must be stressed then, is
uncertainty raises insecurity, and insecurity will affect how a state makes a decision or
policy.
An anarchic international system then obliges every state to be prudent of its own
action. In turn, this creates a difficult situation to promote a cooperative venture between
states. In "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", Jervis (2009: 125) offers a view of
cooperation between states in the situation of security dilemmas. Jervis mentions that
there are at least four cooperation scenarios, namely: (1) each state cooperates and
disarms; (2) the state maintains high-level weapons while others are disarmed; (3) arms
competition and high risk of war; and (4) there are states that are disarmed while other
states are armed. But Jervis (2009: 125) also realizes that there’s a caveat, even though
every state has a common goal of security and stability, they may not be able to achieve
it because they do not trust their own counterpart.
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Therefore, with Jervis’ view in mind (2009: 125), it can be assumed that in the
context of India-Pakistan military conflicts, it seems that the both states relations are now
conforming the third scenario; arms competition and have a high risk of war. Further, the
tension between India and Pakistan is also in line with the two variables proposed by
Jervis because the two states continue to build defense forces and make offensive policies
towards each other. This condition has prompted the two states to enter the arms races
and their respective military forces clash. This also explains why the two states see each
other as a threat. Therefore, both parties do not want to take the risk in making efforts to
resolve the military conflict by carrying out disarmament. Instead of disarming, both India
and Pakistan are looking for alliances capable of arming them and strengthening their
military.
Based on this explanation, there are at least three reasons why the security
dilemma concept is relevant in analyzing the behavior of India and Pakistan. First, this
concept can explain comprehensively the dynamics that occur in South Asia, especially
between India and Pakistan, it covers many aspects such as defense and security policies,
defense equipment acquisitions, military cooperation, nuclear weapon competitions, and
the amelioration corresponding capabilities. Second, the security dilemma concept is able
to simplify the causes and explanations of war and conflict. And finally, this concept is
able to explain the influence of national interests and global conditions of the respective
state decision-making process.

RESEARCH METHOD
To answer the research question, this paper will use qualitative methods, especially
process tracing to highlight the causal mechanism (Beach, 2016) within this case. The
research data that being utilized are secondary source materials such as books, journals,
and articles from online and printed media within a time 1999 (after the Lahore
Declaration) until 2019. Then, the data collection method that being utilized are archival
& desk research, and media monitoring, especially from the online media. After the data
was collected, the author triangulated the findings in order to test the validity & reliability
of collected data. Triangulation is done by comparing the data obtained in the study with
the findings that corresponds with the inquiry. In the last section, this paper will look the
development of the India-Pakistan military conflict after the 1999 Lahore Declaration
until 2019, it is done in order to observe the escalation of the military conflict after the
peace agreement was carried out.
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DISCUSSION
This paper will use two security dilemma variables that proposed by Jervis (2009) to
operationalize the analytical framework. The two variables that contribute to the security
dilemma are; the development of defense forces and offensive policies (Jervis, 2009).
Therefore, this paper will highlights increasing Indian and Pakistani military strength as
a result of perception of threat in regarding each others behavior. Then, this paper will
show offensive policies towards each other, especially foreign policy because the military
conflicts that occur between the two states always stems from the respective state's
decision to carry out attacks. At the final section, this paper will show data on military
conflicts that occurred between India and Pakistan after the 1999 Lahore Declaration to
2019 to show that the peace agreement was unable to withstand the eruption of conflict,
or possibly a war.

Construction of the Indian-Pakistani Defense System Strength
In this paper, the author will describe the behavior of India and Pakistan which could be
classified as threatening such as the defense equipment acquisitions, a nuclear weaponry
development, and forming security alliances within the period of 1999 -the post-Kargil
War era- until 2019.

Development of the Strength of the Indian Defense System
The defense sector that is the main expenses in the Indian economy. To put into context,
this can be understood by India’s geographical conditions which borders seven
neighboring states, and span the area of 15,000 km wide. These geographical features are
a challenge for the Indian Defense Force.10 In this section the author will highlights
India’s defense spending.
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Figure 1. Purchasing Indian Defense Equipment 1998-201811
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

The graphic shows data of Indian defense equipment acquisition from 1998-2018
with a relatively high frequency despite fluctuations. The data can be understood that
there is a tendency of India to increase its defense capabilities. As the author mentioned
before, acquiring defense equipment will increase the likelihood of the security dilemma
condition.
Based on data taken from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) from 1998-2018, India has carried out purchases of various types of defense
equipment, including land, sea, and air defense, from 23 countries: Australia, Denmark,
France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, England, America, Brazil, Canada, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Norway,
Slovakia, Switzerland, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Further, out of total 357 transactions, 285
of those are a new transaction, whereas 74 of those are a repeat order. This sum was
generated due to inability to send the whole units that already purchased in a single
transaction. For example, India has purchased 330 units of SA-316B Allouette-3
helicopter in 1962, yet India only acquire the full 330 units in 2003. In other words, it was
because the unit was delivered gradually. India has the highest frequency of arms
purchase with Russia. India conducts an arms purchase with Russia for 118 times. At the
second place, Israel, in which India conducts 77 times arms purchase, and at the third
place, the United States, in which India conducts 36 times arms purchase. It was then
followed by Germany, with 18 times of arms purchase, and with Italy & Ukraine with 17
times arms purchases. Whereas for the rest of India’s partners, India only conducts five
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times arms purchases on average. The high frequency of transactions carried out by India
and Russia shows that the two states have close cooperation, especially in the field of
military cooperation.
The data shown above was released by UNROCA (United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms). The study itself covers the year 1999 to 2017. In addition, a report
from BBC, showed that Russia has been a major arms supplier for India for quite long
time. India’s defense equipment purchases to Russia reached its summit on 2012, with a
total US $ 10 billion transaction. India is also listed as the largest arms importer in the
world, whereas Russia itself, supplies 70% of India's weapons needs.12 The RussianIndian military cooperation was increasingly marked by the "Make in India" program,
namely India's efforts to modernize its defense industry by developing a domestic defense
industry assisted by Russian arms exporter company Rosoboronexport. This collaboration
was further discussed in the "Defexpo India 2016 International Land and Naval Systems
Exhibition". Weapons exported from Russia and developed in India are the following;
T-90MS Tagil-the new improved version of the best Russian MBT, T-90MS battle tanks,
BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, Kalashnikov 100 series assault rifles, air defense
systems, and various naval vessels.13
Russia and India have established strategic relationships that are mutually
beneficial, especially in the field of defense and military cooperation since the 1960s. The
closeness of these two states provokes protests from the United States. India has received
a warning from Washington about buying weapons from Russia. Under the current rules
on Russia, the United States can impose sanctions on third party countries if they transact
with the Russian defense or intelligence sector.14 This warning was ignored by India,
given the amicable relationship between the United States and Pakistan. India itself is
more comfortable in forging an alliance with the superpower that hostile towards
Pakistan. This findings also show that the competition between India and Pakistan also
impacted on how the both states form their own alliance. India sought an alliance with
Russia in spite of warnings from the United States.
The row of defense equipment are increasingly strengthened by the presence of
nuclear weaponry developed by India even since before its independences. India
conducted its nuclear test in May 1998, in which India conducted five nuclear tests on an
area within the proximity of Pakistan. These series of test provoked the 1999 Kargil
War.15 In 2006, India collaborated with the United States -at the time of Bush’s
administration- in developing nuclear reactors. The cooperation was finally done after
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the United States had opposed the transfer of nuclear weapon technology to India for
several times.16 Whereas for 2019, India has signed an agreement to lease nuclearpowered submarines from Russia for the next 10 years. Russia is indeed the main supplier
of weapons and defense systems in India after the Cold War. This is also done by India
to counteract its rival Pakistan. The series of action that was conducted by India was
eventually triggered a similar reaction from Pakistan. This situation is just like what Chari
(2004: 19) argued that military conflict between India and Pakistan which reached the
nuclear threshold was confirmed by the belief among the Indian bomb protagonists that
‘Pakistan is a rogue state’, its leaders are irrational and could not be trusted not to use
nuclear weapons, therefore India had to be ‘prepared’.

Development of the Pakistan Defense System
In response to India, Pakistan sought to develop cutting-edge weapons. The following
graphs shows Pakistan defense equipment purchase from 1998 to 2018:

Figure 2. Purchasing Pakistani Defense Equipment 1998-201817
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

It can be inferred from the graphics that, although Pakistan has a comparatively
lower frequency of a defense purchase, Pakistan is more consistent in its build-up. Based
on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Pakistan
conducted 214 various major conventional weapons purchase in which; 189 of those are
a new transaction and 25 being a repeat order within the period of 1998-2018 with 23
different countries namely: China, France, Italy, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the United
States, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, the
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Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, Ukraine and the
United Kingdom. China is a major partner of Pakistan. Pakistan has conducted 63 times
arms purchases with China, it is then followed by the United States with 60 times arms
purchases. And in its France in the third place with 15 times arms purchases. Pakistan
only conducted nine arms purchases on average with the rest of its partners.
Since the 1960s Pakistan has cooperated with the United States. In addition to the
United States, Pakistan also cooperates with China, Russia and a number of Eastern
European states. Pakistan’s decision to cooperate with China provoked a hostile reaction
from the United States, which can be seen on 1965 India-Pakistan War in which the
United States halted its military assistance to Pakistan, and again in 1990s decade when
the US halted its assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weaponry development. Being
terminated with the US means greater opportunity for Pakistan to cooperate with China.
A 2018 report mentions that China plans to build a second offshore naval base near a
strategic port of Pakistan. The closeness of the two states was dubbed "iron brother" by
the deputy chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission Fan Changlong. The
effort to increase this cooperation can be interpreted as balancing effort to counteract
India and the United States (US).18 This military cooperation includes; design of JF-17
fighter jets by China and assembled in Pakistan; sales of secret submarines from China to
Pakistan worth US$ 5 billion; joint naval training; fighting terrorism, and high-level
defense negotiations.19 Furthermore, security issues in Central Asia are described as
"insecurity interdependence by external forces" due to the contestation of major powers
such as the United States, Russia and China so that hostility patterns are more prominent
in the region (Pratama, 2013: 91).
Pakistan's resources and economic capability, which is relatively smaller than India
in, motivates Pakistan to seek a more alliance. Although the military cooperation does not
run smoothly with the US, the US is still the main supplier of Pakistani weapons. But the
most interesting thing is, Pakistan itself is playing a double game, seeing its relationship
with the US deteriorates, Pakistan readied itself by strengthening its alliance with China.
Therefore, both Pakistan and India are inseparable from the cycle of security dilemmas
by taking action in the trend of alliances, arms races, and improvement of the defense
system.
India has advantages in terms of military formations both in the number of troops
and in the number of weapons. To counteract this, Pakistan has trump card namely; its
nuclear capabilities which is claimed to be more powerful than nuclears possessed by
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India. Based on data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
in June 2018, Pakistan is said to have 140-150 nuclear warheads, while India only has
130-140 nuclear warheads. Pakistani independently developed nuclear was baptized as
Shaheen-III. The missile is a short-range ballistic missile that can carry a nuclear bomb.
This missile claimed by Pakistani officials will prevent India from launching a sudden
conventional attack. The Pakistani military also announced that this missile could shoot
down any weapon system. This is supported by the opinion of experts who said that, by
increasing its rocket maneuverability while increasing its range from 60 to 70 km.20 This
weapon system is able to launch multiple missiles at once, hence it will allows Pakistan
to attack several targets at the same time. Besides its nuclear superiority, Pakistan's
superiority also lies in the abundance of nuclear resources, namely uranium, while India
has more limited uranium resources.
India's nuclear weaponry development activities in collaboration with Russia has
sparked a similar reaction from Pakistan. The development of Pakistan's tactical nuclear
weapons and Indian nuclear certainly increases the risk of nuclear war between India and
Pakistan. The development of the defense system in the end only perpetuates animosity
between the two states.

Indian and Pakistani Military Strengths
Beside building the strength of the defense system from 1998-2019, India and Pakistan
have more formidable military formations. Even though India has advantages in terms of
numbers, Pakistan continues to offset India's strength. This can be seen from Pakistan's
efforts to continue to strengthen its defenses both from the land, sea, and air forces, by
continually adding & renewing weapons and by strengthening military cooperation with
various states. Whereas for Pakistan, the state itself has purchased defense equipment
with the same number of countries as India did, namely 23 states.
The defense system in the military field is classified into several categories. This
categorization refers to the Major Conventional Arms of a state. The weapons category is
as follows:
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Table 1. Categorization of Major Conventional Weapons 21

Source: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)

The following is the 2017 data released by the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms (UNROCA) concerning the numbers of owned Pakistani and Indian
Major Conventional Weapons based on the Main Conventional Weapons categorization:
Table 2. Amount of 2017 India-Pakistan Major Conventional Weapons22
India

Pakistan

Category I

248 units

636 units

Category II

0 unit

910 units

Category III

6163 units

358 units

Category IV

160 units

171 units

Category V

145 units

31 units

Category VI

10 units

12 units

Category VII

20.752 units

10.464 units

Source: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)

From these data, it can be seen that each state has a weapon advantage in certain
categories. In categories, I and II show that Pakistan is superior in the number of battle
tanks and in the possession of armored combat vehicles. India does not even have armored
combat vehicles at all in 2017. India outperformed Pakistan in category III, namely the
number of ownership of large-caliber artillery systems. Category IV (fighter aircraft) and
category VI (warships) both states have competing numbers. Then in category V (attack
helicopters) and category VII (missiles and launchers), Pakistan again outnumbered with
India.
From the data of India and Pakistan defense system, it appears that the two states
have formidable military power that able to launch an attack towards each other. The
ability of states to make strategic adaptations in anticipating the unpredictable character
of war must be developed to maintain its survival (Widjajanto, 2013: 7). The view that
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each other is a threat manifested in the form of continuation of military build-up and
state’s ability to perform strategic adaptiveness. The purchase of weapons continues to be
carried out consistently by both states. India has a number of advantages compared to
Pakistan, both from the number of troops and the number of weapons. Pakistan is trying
to keep up with it by buying the latest units from every categories even in small quantities.
The condition of this dilemma was strengthened by the actions of the two states that
developed nuclear weapons, despite the 1999 Lahore Declaration in which Pakistan and
India had agreed on nuclear non-proliferation.

Offensive Policy
The second variable of the security dilemma based on the Jervis view is the policies that
tend to be offensive. The policy is an instrument of a state in maintaining sovereignty and
maintaining stability. From Jervis’ point of view, the series of actions by two states can
be interpreted as an interplay of soft and hard power to maintain their own stability. The
development of a defense system is an act of hard power. The use of hard power itself
needs to be supported by policy or soft power that supports it. Therefore, a capable
defense system must be supported by offensive policies. The policy, in this case, is the
foreign policy in the military field. That is what makes these two variables complement
each other, and further lead to a situation of relatively lasting security dilemmas. This
section will discuss Indian and Pakistani policy, especially in the military field which has
offensive indications.

India Foreign Policy
India is a state that has strong dominance in the South Asian region. This can be seen
from India's hard power such as a strong defense system, solid military formation, and
technology that continues to be developed (Bhatnagar & Passi, 2016). In addition to hard
power, India's dominance is supported by soft power which is can be observed in its
policy. Indian foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi aims to maintain
India's stability as a regional hegemon. This aspiration translated into “Neighborhood
First” foreign policy.
“Neighborhood First” foreign policy is Indian foreign policy which emphasizes
the maintenance of its main relationships with SAARC member states (South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation), neighboring states in the East Asia region and,
the Eastern parts of Southeast Asia region (Bhatnagar & Passi, 2016). Pakistan is one of
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the member states of SAARC, so through this policy Pakistan has not “escaped” the
attention of Indian foreign policy. Bhatnagar and Passi (2016) also emphasized that
SAARC is a regional organization that aims to integrate states in the South Asia region
that are always full of suspicion towards each other, with India and Pakistan as the most
prominent example. Besides that, geographically-speaking, India is the state with the
widest territory in South Asia, also India has a strategic position located in the middle of
the region. With land and maritime territory that separates every state in the region except
Pakistan and Afghanistan, making Pakistan an Indian-Locked area, because to access
Pakistan must cross India (Bhatnagar & Passi, 2016). Therefore, although this policy
seems to have a broad scope, through the Neighborhood First policy it becomes a gap for
India to lock in Pakistan.
India perceives Pakistan and China economic cooperation in 2015 called the
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as a threat. In Asia, India is China’s
equivalent counterpart, then the conflictual degrees of India and Pakistan are at a very
high point. The alliance of China and Pakistan is of course seen as a threat by India, both
a threat to the status quo stability of India in the region and stability in terms of “bilateral”
relationship with Pakistan itself. This high conflictual history with the two states made
the Indian government respond to China-Pakistan cooperation by changing the orientation
of Neighborhood First policies be more offensive towards the two states, especially
Pakistan. The change in orientation of this policy is mainly in the sphere of defense. In
this case, India's defense interests under PM Narendra Modi are categorized into two
locus: (1) defense from the threat of terrorism which manifested in the signing of the MoU
on cooperation against terrorism with the United States in 2015 (US Embassy &
Consulates in India), and (2) Kashmir's territorial conflict with Pakistan (Testimony,
2018). Therefore, if there is a provocative attack or behavior from Pakistan or a Pakistani
terror group, the Neighborhood First policy becomes the justification of India's attack on
Pakistan.
The latest case of India and Pakistan, namely the attack on each other using air
forces on 26 and 27 February 2019, is an evidence of India’s offensive foreign policy.
The attack was initiated by Indian Air Forces by entering the Pakistani region of Kashmir
and firing on a militant group based in Pakistan called Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). India
admitted that its air force has carried out attacks in Pakistan, targeting camps run by the
JeM militant group. Indian Foreign Secretary, Vijay Gokhale, claimed to have succeeded
in killing a large number of militant Jaish-e-Mohammed, including trainers, commanders,
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and groups who were being trained for fidayeen (suicide) in the operation. Subsequently,
an Indian security official told DW that the operation utilized a Mirage 2000 aircraft,
which flew across the Line of Control (LoC) and dropped 1,000 kilograms of bombs.
Mirage 2000 is a fourth-generation single-engine fighter jet made in France manufactured
by Dassault Aviation.23
The operation of the Indian military air force was triggered by a suicide bombing
by Pakistani militant Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) which killed 40 Central Reserve troops
in Pulwama district, Indian-controlled Kashmir on February 14, 2019. This JeM group
attack occurred when 78 Indian convoy vehicles carrying 2,547 central reserve police
forces were attacked by a terrorist bomb blast. This attack is the bloodiest incident since
the 2008 Mumbai attack.24 Things are becoming more complicated because the Indian
government believes that the Pakistani government is the mastermind behind this
incident, so this is the basis for India to retaliate Pakistani security measure. The Indian
government seems to never refrained in initiating the first strike if it is related to Pakistan.
India must attack, especially what must be attacked is "Neighborhood First".

Pakistan Foreign Policy
Foreign policy is formulated based on the state's national interests. As with India,
Pakistan's national interest is to maintain its stability from external threats. With South
Asian regional security and India's dominance in mind, Pakistan then prioritized two
issues to be addressed with its foreign policy namely; adequate defense in the face of
neighboring states (India) that were relatively much stronger and a priority to increase
bargaining position towards India in the Kashmir problem (Syaifuddin, 2005). These two
issues are security issues have the potential to disrupt Pakistan's stability. Further, the
Kashmir region military conflict can be amplified by India's nuclear weaponry
development and an increase in India's medium-range missile capabilities that can reach
Pakistan. The issue of Kashmir and India's nuclear weaponry program are interrelated
issues, so it is therefore logical for the Pakistani foreign policy focuses on tackle these
issues.25
Foreign policy can also change depending on national interests and international
conditions, this is also what happened to Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's foreign
policy in the 1990s experienced a shift. Initially, Pakistan can be characterized as
“inward-looking”, and it shifted its to focus to become more open to the outside world,
especially with the US invasion of Iraq related to the events of 9/11 (Khan, 2007: 461).
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Khan (2007) also suggested that Pakistan even posture itself as a “frontline state” in the
War on Terror which was pioneered by the United States. This action thus automatically
triggered a reaction from India. In addition to the United States, Pakistan has also formed
a strategic partnership with China which aims to check Indian power in the region.
Pakistan is well aware of its geographical, economic, defense and military
position. Unstable relations with India make Pakistan must always be in a "standby"
position. It is understandable due to India relatively higher capabilities. To mitigate this,
Pakistan also cooperates with superpowers such as the United States and China, in
addition to building a defense system. This is the formula for Pakistan's foreign policy.
From this, it can be said that the characteristics of Pakistani foreign policy in the 21st
century are seeking security through external alliances (Chaziza, 2016: 2).
Concerning the discussion, the latest Pakistan's foreign policy that must be
observed occurred on February 2019. At the time, the Pakistani government carried out
an offensive maneuver against India by shooting down two fighter planes of Indian
military forces that entered the territory of Pakistani Kashmir. Military spokesman, Major
General Asif Ghafoor said that Pakistani Air Forces shot down the two fighter jets in their
own territory. One fighter jet fell in the Pakistani region of Kashmir, while another
crashed in Indian territory.26 Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Faisal
stated that the only purpose of the action was to demonstrate Pakistan's right, willingness
and ability to defend itself. Mohammad Faisal then added that the Pakistani government
does not want an increase in hostility, yet fully prepared if the circumstances dictates them
to do so.27 From the statement, it can be concluded that Pakistani Foreign Policy contains
offensive values in terms of willingness to take offensive actions to maintain sovereignty.
This is also in line with Jervis' view of (2008) the security dilemma that postulates “it is
better if a war can be averted, should it can’t, that war must be won”. So better warfare
does not occur, but if it has to happen then the state must win. With this view, any party
will not reduce the intention of an attack on a state that is considered threatening.

Escalation of Military Conflict Post-Lahore Declaration 1999
The 1999 Kargil War was one of the major battles between India and Pakistan, although
still with the same motive, namely the dispute over the Kashmir region. Based on the data
the author obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in the armed
conflict sector (Armed Conflict Dataset), there were 10 armed conflicts with 1,527
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victims after 1998. Following are graphs of the Indian-Pakistani armed conflict from
1998-2017 displayed by UCDP:

Figure 2. Escalation of the India-Pakistan Armed Conflict 1998-201728
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)

From these data, it can be seen that there were 10 armed conflicts after the signing
of the 1999 Lahore Declaration. The conflict itself reach the summit 1999 itself. Then, a
high level military conflict occured again in 2003, it was when India and Pakistan
conducted a nuclear test. The India-Pakistan military conflict was amplified by the
presence of militant groups based in Pakistan who also carried out acts terror. Reported
by the BBC, in 2002, members of the militant groups based in Pakistan carried out an
attack on Indian security forces in Kashmir which killed at least 31 people at an Indian
military base in Kaluchak near Jammu. Most of the victims were civilians who were
relatives of soldiers. Then in 2016, at least 19 Indian soldiers were killed when Pakistani
militia groups again attacked Indian military bases in Uri. This attack was immediately
followed by Indian military retaliation which killed the famous militia member Burhan
Wani. In 2018, more than 500 people were killed, including civilians, security forces and
militia members due to clashes between the two countries. 29
This shows that the 1999 Lahore Declaration was not the endpoint of the two
states' disputes. The peace agreement can only temporarily reduce military conflict. A
series of military conflicts always occurred between India and Pakistan within 20 years
after the signing of 1999 Lahore Declaration. These situations were also reinforced by
conflicts throughout the 2000s which were marked by the militant groups based in
Pakistan to the latest armed terror and military conflict in 2019. It was when the two states
mobilized their air forces to attack each other. Several times India has called on the United
Nations to designate Jaish-e-Mohammed as a state-sponsored terrorist group, but Pakistan
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has always opposed the measure, and denies on the basis of “groundless accusation”. This
Pakistani statement was later corroborated by support from China.30 Therefore, the
Indian-Pakistani military conflict persists not only due to the actions of a “legal entity”
but also number of militant groups.

CONCLUSION
An anarchic international system of encourages each state to prioritize the stability of
their respective states. The stability is enhanced by building defense capabilities. This
view which rooted in realism proposes that a state that has strong forces and weapons will
have great power so that it will be safe from threats. But the caveat is this view is also
contains an element of paradox because the anarchic international structure forces dictate
the every state to be aggressive towards each other in order to be safe. This situation in
turns, creates the security dilemma condition. The security dilemma itself can be observed
with two variables in mind, (1) the development of defense system, and (2) offensive
policies. This situation manifested in the relationships of India and Pakistan, which
continued to experience an escalation of hostility towards each other, despite the existence
of 1999 Lahore Declaration peace agreement. The peace agreement that has been carried
out is not able to stop the military conflict, but only temporarily dampens it, because India
and Pakistan see each other's behavior such as building defense forces, nuclear weaponary
development, and alliance trends as threats. The military conflict between the two states
is relatively “persistent” due to the security dilemma.
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